Abstract. An important puzzle in …nancial economics is why fund's managers invest in short-maturity assets when they could obtain larger pro…ts in assets with longer maturity. This work provides an explanation for this fact based on the labor contracts signed between institutional investors and fund's managers. Using the career concerns setup, we examine how the optimal contract design, in the presence of both explicit and implicit incentives, a¤ects the fund manager's decisions on investment horizons. Conditions under which young (old) managers prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) positions are stated and the robustness of these results to some extensions is evaluated. Our main …ndings suggest that the framework considered in this work may be a good starting point for explaining episodes of overreaction in stock prices.
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Introduction
One of the most puzzling results in …nancial economics is why fund's managers invest in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain larger pro…ts in assets with longer maturity. This puzzle may become particularly important as long as the large recurrence of this phenomenon may eventually a¤ect the equilibrium prices in …nancial markets. In this paper, we propose an explanation for this puzzling behavior based mainly upon two facts. First, during the last decades the institutional investors have increased dramatically their participation in the …nancial system. 1 Consequently, it is reasonable to conjecture that the labor contracts signed by this class of investors and their managers may play an important role as determinants of the the stock prices'dynamics. Second, there is a recent evidence supporting the fact that young fund's managers exhibit a clear bias in favor of short-maturity securities. This suggests thus the usefulness of considering a theoretical framework in which decisions on investment maturities may be driven by an age-based agent heterogeneity.
We combine these two facts in a career concerns-based model in which the institutional investor (the principal) designs an optimal contract that considers the explicit and implicit incentives of two class of fund' s managers (the agents): young and old traders. The former is a trader which care about how the current performance a¤ect his future compensation and the latter is a trader without career concerns. The major prediction of our model is that, under certain conditions, this optimal contract leads the young (old) managers to prefer shortmaturity (long-maturity) investments. Within the career concerns set-up, the intuition behind this result is quite simple. Since the history of old traders'performance have already been revealed, the principal's prediction about their ability is better than that made when they are young. This implies that the fund's owner exhibits more reliability on old traders than the young ones, authorizing therefore the formers to hold bolder positions.
The main implication of our model is that such an investment horizon bias may eventually explain some episodes of stock price overreactions observed in practice. This means therefore that our setting is able to shed light on a very relevant …nancial puzzle by characterizing an interesting and so far unexplored link between both the labor market and the …nancial market. In this sense, our …nal extension takes into account the impact of including career concerns in stock markets equilibrium, based on Hong (1998) .
Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results whether we include both career-risk concerns -how the agent's current performance a¤ects the variation in his future compensation -and training onthe-job costs. On the one hand, our …ndings suggest that the main results hold when the managers' career concerns prevail, i.e., when the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives is still observed. On the other hand, the training on-the-job costs increase the probability that young managers prefer non-contingent long-term contracts, i.e., increases the incentives to hold longmaturity assets. However, as long as the di¤erence between the short-maturity investments variance and the long-maturity one is su¢ ciently large, the young manager's short-term contract surplus becomes eventually greater than the longterm one, reversing therefore the horizon decisions.
Our work is in connection with a plenty of literature, both theoretical and applied one. For instance, one of the works that supports empirically the fund's managers preferences for short-maturity positions is that of Chevalier and Ellison (1999) . They …nd that young fund's managers are more risk averse in selecting their portfolios -by choosing short-maturity securities-than the old ones, even though in this way, they obtain less pro…ts by comparison with what they could get holding more mature assets. Furthermore, their results suggest a nonlinear relationship between managerial turnover and mutual fund's performance. This means that for young traders the managerial turnover is more performance-sensitive than the old ones and they observe a U-shape in the relationship between managerial turnover and trader's performance. Chevalier and Ellison explain this fact through the di¤erences in the career concerns among them. In this way, as well as Dutta and Reichelsen (2003) and Sabac (2006) , our work tries to explain theoretically this empirical evidence through the di¤erences in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and old managers.
Moreover, a large literature in economics and …nance have studied the determinants of the executive compensation contracts. Nevertheless, only a minority part has focused on how the fund managers'implicit incentives a¤ect the design of these contracts, and through this, the investment horizon decisions. The exceptions are Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , Meyer and Vickers (1997) , Dutta and Reichelsen (2003) , Christensen et al. (2005) and Sabac (2006) . All of these works study how optimal contracts including manager's career concerns can explain the aforementioned nonlinear managerial turnover-performance relationship for young and old managers. In general, this literature analyzes dynamic settings with short-term contracts based on the career concerns model developed by Holmström (1999) .
For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) assume that the principal's bargaining power is null, i.e. that the principal's expected surplus is zero in equilibrium. On the contrary, Meyer and Vickers (1997) develop a model in which the bargaining power is on the principal's hands, i.e., in equilibrium the agent's certainty equivalent is zero at each contracting date. Another di¤erence between both works is that while the former shows the equivalence between short-term contracts and renegotiation-proof contracts, the latter proves that the agent's e¤ort in equilibrium and the total surplus are independent of the bargaining power. Trying to encompass these models, Sabac (2006) characterizes the optimal short-term contract which satis…es renegotiation-proof including long-term actions, when today actions a¤ect not only today but also tomorrow performance. Unlike all this literature, we attempt to explain how the fund manager's horizon investment decisions are determined by the design of his optimal labor contracts regarding both short and long-term actions.
Finally, our paper is also related to some corporate …nance literature. In particular, Von Thadden (1995) constructs a dynamic model with asymmetric information between risk neutral investors and …rms. Under his framework, it make impossible to implement long-term projects under certain circumstances which are more pro…table. This work then tries to explain why some myopic lenders could induce to their borrowers -an entrepreneur …rm-to invest in short-term projects. However, unlike our setting, Von Thadden takes only into account the risk-neutral agent's explicit incentives but not his implicit incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a principal-agent model that predicts under which circumstances the optimal contract induces to the fund's manager to make some investment horizon decision. In Section 3, we examine the robustness of the results in front of human capital risk and training on-thejob costs. As an extension of the previous result, Section 4 examines the Hong and Stein (1999) 's model by analyzing the behavior of asset returns when we consider the di¤erent incentives resulting from contracts signed by young and old momentum traders. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and discusses other possible extensions. All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
The Model
The output performance process Consider an agency model in which the principal is the mutual fund's owner and the agent corresponds to the trader, who for simplicity we assume that is the mutual fund's manager as well. The trader works for two periods. In period 1, the trader selects his investment portfolio. The output performance of this process corresponds to the variation of the value of the investments (i.e. the gains of capital) denoted by z t , and is given by an additive formulation of the trader's ability ( ), the trader's non-negative e¤ort (a t ) and a noise ( t ), as follows
We suppose that is normally distributed with mean m 0 and variance 2 0 . Similarly, we assume that the noise t = H t + t is normally distributed with mean H t and variance 2 H as t is zero-mean normally distributed with variance 2 H . Here, the index H denotes the horizon of the investment so that H = S; L means short-term -managers trade short-maturity securities-and long-term investment -managers trade long-maturity securities-, respectively. Moreover, independence among t 's and with ability is assumed. In addition, as it is standard in the career concerns literature, we assume that the true ability of the trader is unknown even for himself. As a consequence, the principal only adjusts her beliefs on the mean and the variance of this ability based upon the information revealed through the investment returns observed in the previous period.
We assume the principal design a set of contracts: long-term and short-term labor contracts which depend linearly of his investments. Therefore, the kind of contracts a¤ect directly the stochastic production process through his random part. Given this setup, the agent decides not only about the e¤ort but also the horizon of his investments (short-maturity assets versus long-maturity ones). The di¤erences in returns in the set of contracts are incorporated through the mean and the variance of the investment's noise part. Following Von Thadden (1995), we assume that the short-term investment gives more bene…ts in the …rst-period than the long-term one. However, regarding the total gains for the two periods, longterm assets are more pro…table than short-term ones. Furthermore, we suppose that the long-term investment is more risky than the short-term one. These ideas are formalized by means of the next additional assumptions:
where represents a discount factor.
Unlike Holmstrom (1999) or Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , we also consider a lag of e¤ort in the stochastic production process (i.e. the investment return). When is equal zero, the agent's action is short-term, in the sense, only a¤ects the today performance; otherwise, it is a long-term one since could explain the future performance. The rationale of this assumption is that the return of the investments depends in part on the trader's ability to interpret correctly the trends of the stock market. This ability can be seen as a learning process that is improved not only with the e¤ort exerted in the current period, but also that made in the previous period. For instance, suppose that there exists a trader who makes his best e¤ort in studying some economic sector in order to analyze a speci…c asset of his portfolio. We assume then, the model would be that this e¤ort is not re ‡ected in the current variation of investments, for example, bad news in the macroeconomic variables. However, the information obtained with the previous period e¤ort could help him to interpret the tendency of prices in the next period and he could thus obtain sucessful results.
The payo¤ functions
Assume that all the bargaining power is on agent's hands. The trader is riskaverse with the following exponential utility function:
where w t is the agent's wage, g(:) measures the disutility of e¤ort and r corresponds to the absolute risk-aversion index. We assume that g(:) is convex and satis…es g 0 (0) = 0; g 0 (1) = 1 and g 000 0.
The fund's owner is risk-neutral with a pro…t function given by
Type of Employment Contracts
We assume throughout the paper that all employment contracts o¤ered by fund's owners to traders corresponds to linear contracts of the form w t (z t ) = c t + b t z t . In this reward scheme, c t , the …xed part, represents the insurance wage since traders are risk averse.and b t , the variable component, is called the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Within this linear formulation, we additionally specify four di¤erent types of labor contracts. First, we characterize two general class of contracts according to its duration: long-term and short-term contracts. In this set-up, a long term contract lasts for two periods and a short-term one only lasts for one-period. Consequently, the trader only invests in long-maturity assets under long-term labor contracts and he only chooses short-maturity securitites under short-term ones. This is the main characteristic of this model. In this sense, the long-term labor contract uncertainty is di¤erent than the short-term one. Second, we aditionally consider two types of labor contracts according to whether they are either contingent or non-contingent to the …rst-period results.
All of this results in four classes of labor contracts. Nevertheless, notice that short-term labor contracts with non-contingent continuation are always strictly dominated by long-term ones. The reason is mainly because two short-term labor contracts imply less expected returns than one long-term labour contract since long-maturity assets are more pro…table than short-maturity ones.
In order to our model account for empirical facts which show us di¤erent investment horizon decisions among traders, we only consider two kind of employment contracts 3 :
(1) Long-term contract with continuation after z 1 z(LC). 4 This is a two-period labor contract in which it does not matter what happens to the …rst-period output. In this sense, it is non-contingent because the continuation of the labor contract to the second-period does not depend on the …rst-period results. This contract allows then the trader to perform long-term investments .
(2) Short-term contract with termination after z 1 z (ST ). In this contract, we include two short-term labor contracts, each one for every period. However, if the …rst period results are less than certain threshold z, the whole contract …nishes and is not renewed to the second period. In this sense, it is a contingent labor contract because under the condition z 1> z, the second-period short-term contract is exerted. This contract allows the trader to perform only short-term investments. Now, to characterize more clearly the optimal contract, let us de…ne y(z 1 ), an indicator function refered as to continuation decision variable, as follows
Timing of the contracting game 3 We do not consider the long-term contract with termination after z 1 z(LT ). This is originally a two-period labor contract. However, if the …rst period results are less than certain threshold z, the contract …nishes and is not renewed to the second period. In this sense, it is a contingent labor contract because under the condition z 1 > z, the contract lasts for two periods. This contract also allows the trader to undertake long-term investments. This is a kind of contract between non-contingent long-term labor contracts and contingent short-term labor contracts. In this sense, we get similar results in several cases as …rst type of contract, i.e., non-contingent long-term labor contract. 4 For instance, z could be equal zero. Thus, after bad results, the contract is not renegotiated.
The timing of this game depends on the type of contract o¤ered by the principal. On the one hand, in the case of short-term labor contracts, the timing is as follows. At the beginning of the …rst period, prospective employers simultaneously o¤er the trader single-period linear wage contracts w 1 (z 1 ) as de…ned before and he chooses the most attractive one. At the end of the …rst period, the principal and the market observe the output z 1 . At the beginning of period 2, if they observe good results, they simultaneously o¤er the trader another single-period linear wage contract w 2 (z 2 ). This contract allows the trader to invest only in short-maturity securities.
On the other hand, there also exists long-term labor contracts in which employers simultaneusly o¤er w 1 (z 1 ) and w 2 (z 2 ) in the …rst period, and the trader chooses the best reward plan.
Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Given these compensation contracts, the trader's expected utility is a function of the …rst and second period e¤ort as follows
where I z (I fz 1 >z g + y(z 1 )I fz 1 z g )I fz 2 >z g . Notice that we include the indicator function I fz 2 >z g in order to shrink only to the cases with positive second-period results since if the trader obtains zero results in the …nal session, he also obtains zero wage. Furthermore, we include I fz 1 >z g and I fz 1 z g in order to encompass in this expression not only non-contingent contracts but also the contingent ones.
5
The main di¤erence between the contract LT and ST is given by both P (z 1 >z) and P (z 2 >z). On the one hand, in the short-term labor contract the trader only (can select?) invests in short-term investments. Thus, P (z 1 >z) only depends on the uncertainty of this class of investments. On the other hand, since the long-term labor contract allows the trader to hold long-term positions, this probability depends on the (di¤erent) characteristics of the distribution of this type of investments.
6
In order to solve this problem, consider the Subperfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) concept. Consequently, we apply backward induction so that we begin characterizing the second-period e¤ort problem. 5 With a non-contingent and contingent contracts and good results in period 2, I z = I fz1>z g I fz2>z g = P (z 1 >z)P (z 2 >z) if z 1 >z but I z = I fz1 z g I fz2>z g if z 1 z in the noncontingent contract and I z = 0 if z 1 z in the contingent one.
6 P (z 1 >z) in the short-term investments is larger than P (z 1 >z) in the long-term ones given the di¤erences in the uncertainty.
First-period contract. From the perspective of the second-period trader, after the …rst-period e¤ort a 1 and horizon investment H have been chosen and z 1 has been observed, his e¤ort choice problem is given by
Hence, a 2 (b 2 ), the optimal second-period agent's e¤ort choice satis…es
Note that we assume that all the bargaining power is on the agents'hands. This means that competition among prospective second-period employers implies that the contract the trader accepts for the second period must generate zero expected pro…ts. Therefore, the principal's zero pro…t condition at period 2 is given by Hence, the optimal …xed part of the second-period wage can be obtained using the following condition
whereâ 1 corresponds to....Using De Groot (1970) , it can be stated that the conditional distribution of given the observed …rst-period output z 1 is Normal with mean
and variance
1 + 2 H , the conditional variance of + 2 given the observed …rst-period output z 1 .
Therefore, for an arbitrary b 2 , given the …rst-period output z 1 , the market believes that:
7 In order to solve this model, we consider some statistical assumptions. See Appendix 1. Now, using the …rst order conditions of this optimization problem, we get the following expression for b 2 :
where C = LC and ST .
Second-period contract. Given the optimal second-period contract derived above, the trader's …rst-period incentive problem is to choose a 1 to maximize:
From the …rst-order condition of this problem, we obtain
So far we have takenâ 1 as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes implicitely the trader's best response to the market's second-period conjecture about the …rst-period e¤ort,â 1 . Since equation (11) does not depend onâ 1 , in equilibrium, the market's conjecture coincides with the optimal …rst period e¤ort. Therefore, the equilibrium conjecture iŝ
As was established before, the principal's expected pro…t must be zero in each period. Hence, assuming a 0 = 0, we have that
Substituting a 1 (b 1 ) and c 1 (b 1 ) into (10) yields the …rst-period trader's expected utility for an arbitrary b 1 :
with
The …rst-order condition of this problem with respect to b 1 gives us the following expression:
) Coments on characteristics of the optimal contract. We observe three e¤ects which a¤ect the variable part of the compensation or pay-for-performance part: (i) noise reduction e¤ect which represents the higher the conditional variance of output, the smaller the variable compensation, i.e., principal prefers less noise in the production process, (ii) career concerns e¤ect which re ‡ects the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives, the higher the implicit incentives measures through b 2 and the contingency or not of the contract I z , the smaller the pay-for performance part and …nally, (iii) human capital risk e¤ect which represents risk averse trader wants to be compensated by high variances in his performance due to low realizations of ability.
It is worthy to note how the di¤erences in the type of contracts a¤ect mainly this substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives. Therefore, we observe di¤erent …rst-period and second-period linear wages depending on contingency or non-contingency in the contracts and its horizon -short-term or long-term. In this sense, di¤erent wages for each kind of contract.
In the next section, we endogeneize the career-risk concerns (or human capital risk) in the model which mainly a¤ect this substitutability.
Surplus and Investment Horizon Decisions
First, we analyze the old trader's surplus, S Old , when he signs the two di¤erent aforementioned class of contracts: non-contingent long-term labor contracts (LC) and contingent short-term ones (ST ). In our setup, old trader is who do not care about his future career and young one is who have career concerns.
Notice that the optimal incentives depend on the variances of the horizon investment and the variances of the manager's ability, then, both of them determine also the agent's total surplus. However, not only the volatility of the projects are the main components of the surplus but also the expected returns of these ones. We can see how these two e¤ects, hereafter, term of contract e¤ect, in ‡uence in the horizon investment's decisions.
Proposition 2.1 The following inequality holds S
Proof: See Appendix 1.
In the case z 1 0, we have S
ST
Old < S LC Old , this means the old managers prefer long-term projects with continuation after bad news because they are cover not only his risk aversion but also the risk of the project since long-maturity assets are more risky than short-maturity ones.
On the other hand, when 2 S = 2 L and z 1 > 0, old managers prefer to invest in long-maturity projects as long as the di¤erences in total expected returns of long-maturity assets versus short-maturity ones are large enough. In this way, if the bargaining power were at principal's hands, fund's owner will design a noncontingent long term labor contract such that manager chooses to put the money on long-maturity securities.
It is worthy to notice that the main di¤erence with Von Thadden work's is that when we include implicit incentives, long-maturity investments are preferred to short-term ones for managers without career concerns, old traders under certain conditions in expected returns of long-maturity projects and short-maturity ones 8 . Now, we analyze the young manager's surplus, S young , when he accepts our two type of labor contracts, long-term and short-term. Notice that, young traders care about how his current performance a¤ect his future compensation, i.e., traders who have career concerns.
Proposition 2.2 The following inequality holds S
Proof: This result is obtained using the fact b
and the implicit incentives.
In sum, under certain conditions about di¤erences in volatility and expected returns between long-term investments and the short-term ones, young managers can choose short-term investment's decision and old managers can make long-term ones. The intuition behind this result is that since the history of old traders'performance have been revealed, then, the mutual fund owners'prediction about their ability is better that when they are young. This result implies that owners have more reliability in old traders than the young ones. Therefore, owners authorize old traders to hold positions by more time compared with young momentum traders.
Proposition 2.3 Under certain conditions about expected returns and volatility between short-maturity assets and long-maturity ones, traders without career concerns prefer long-term labor contracts and traders with career concerns prefer short-term ones.
Inside the empirical literature, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show the old managers hold their positions for large horizons because they are bolder in their investments strategies in mutual fund markets which rea¢ rm our theoretical results.
Extensions

Including Human Capital Risk
In the last section, we only take into account reputation concerns, i.e., how the manager's current performance a¤ects the level of his future compensation, however, the agent's current performance also a¤ects the variation in his future compensation, hereafter, career-risk concerns or human capital risk 9 . The main implication of this extension is we could observe complementarity between implicit and explicit incentives instead of substitutability as we seen before, which a¤ects the last two propositions in di¤erent ways.
In order to implement this extension, we introduce a correlation in the ability process. Now, the ability or productivity measure follows a Normal Stationary AR(1) process. In this way, t is correlated over time through the next system:
9 Mukherjee (2005) and Chen and Jiang (2004) .
As in the last section, we assume both the principal and the agent share the common prior that is zero mean normal distributed with variance . Further, is a zero mean gaussian normal process independent of but with variance equal to . Therefore, 1 and 2 have the same unconditional variance. Notice that has an important role in this process because when = 1, we are in the benchmark case without career-risk concerns. In addition, captures the degree of persistence of the agent's career concerns since a higher implies higher sensitivity of the agent's future compensation to current-period performance. Then, introducing 2 [0; 1], we analyze the relationship between the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the degree of the agent´s career concerns, which in some speci…c cases it could be a positive relationship. For simplicity, from now on, we assume E ( ) = m 0 = 0. Now, following Chen and Jiang (2004) , we introduce a new kind of e¤ort: information collection e¤ort, e 2 [0; 1]. In this way, the manager can exert another e¤ort in order to produce a publicly veri…able report, r, about his ability . There exists some linear relationship between the report and the ability: r = 1 + , where is a zero mean normal innovation term orthogonal to 1 with variance
. This variance implies that the higher information collection e¤ort, the higher the precision of the report to forecast 1 . We assume that the principal only uses the report r for contracting goals.
As in the previous section, we assume the contract takes the linear form: w t = c t + b t z t + t r where c t ; b t and t are constants. Notice that we introduce r as a variable that can help the principal to forecast the next period ability. In this way, the wage system can rewrite as:
We assume e is not contractible, i.e., it is chosen by the agent after the contract is o¤ered to him. Therefore, the timeline has the next …gure:
Principal offers a wage payment contingent on z 1 and r.
Agent chooses both a 1 and e.
First-period contract is executed and z 1 and r are observed. Second-period contract is signed.
Agent chooses a 2 .
Second-period contract is executed and z 2 is observed.
In order to solve the model, we consider again SPNE concept. Then, using backward induction, at the beginning of the second-period after z 1 and r are observed, a 1 , e and H has been chosen, the principal chooses c 2 and b 2 to maximize the expected pro…t subject to the agent's participation and the incentive compatibility constraint. Then, the second period e¤ort choice problem is:
thus, a 2 (b 2 ) satis…es g 0 (a 2 ) = b 2 . As in the previous section, normalizing the price of output to unity and using zero pro…t condition, we obtain c 2 (z 1 ; b 2 ):
In this way, we observe how the reputation concerns, , and career-risk concerns, e, a¤ect the agent's …xed wage. Now, replacing c 2 (z 1 ; b 2 ) and a 2 (b 2 ) in the agent's maximization problem, we obtain b 2 :
We observe a positive implicit relationship between information collection e¤ort and second-period explicit incentives through the the total conditional variance.
Given the optimal second-period contract derive above, the trader's …rst-period incentive problem is to choose a 1 to maximize the following problem:
Then, we obtain:
(1 e)
So far we have takenâ 1 , as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes the worker's best response to the market's second-period conjecture about …rst-period e¤ort,â 1 . Since equation (23) does not depend onâ 1 , in equilibrium, the market's conjecture coincides with the optimal …rst period e¤ort.
Therefore, the equilibrium conjecture is:
As we established before, owners' expected pro…ts must be zero in each period. Hence, assuming a 0 = 0,
but E(r) = 0, then we obtain the same expression as our benchmark case.
Substituting a 1 (b 1 ) and c 1 (b 1 ) in the …rst-period maximization problem yields the …rst-period worker's expected utility for an arbitrary b 1 :
Then, the …rst order condition with respect to b 1 gives us the following expression:
with C = LC and ST . Proof: Under the assumptions 2 S < 2 L and for any > 1 large enough such that
, when e is large enough, the implicit incentives vanishes, getting, in some cases, the following inequality b
which assure the old managers surplus in the long-term contracts will be greater than the short-term ones. Proof: With the assumption that implicit incentives are strong, i.e. e is small enough, the …rst-period short-term labor contract surplus is greater than the longterm one. The fact implicit incentives take an important role guarantees the young managers variable compensation in the non-contingent long-term contracts will be small than the short-term ones, i.e., there exists a substitutability of implicit incentives and explicit incentives as in our benchmark case.
In sum, including career-risk concerns, there exist some cases in which both young and old managers could invest in long-maturity projects, in particular, when the implicit incentives no longer prevail.
With Training on-the-Job Spendings
First, we assume reductions in the e¤ort costs by training on-the-job spendings only appears in the second-period contract. Let the training on-the-job costs be a linear function of the …rst period output, lz 1 . In this way, young managers do not obtain advantage of this kind of bene…ts. second, old managers improve their utilities when they are trained by the mutual fund only in their productivity through the reduction in their e¤ort cost.
As in the previous section, we assume contract takes the linear form: w t = c t +b t z t where c t and b t are constants. Using again SPNE concept, at the beginning of the second-period, after z 1 , a 1 and H has been chosen, the principal chooses c 2 and b 2 to maximize the expected pro…t subject to the agent's participation and the incentive compatibility constraint. Then, the second period e¤ort choice problem is:
where l is the training on-the-job cost function's parameter.
. Since the convexity of the e¤ort cost function, the intuition is old managers increases their e¤ort as long as marginal training onthe-job cost increases. Now, since all the bargaining power is on the agents' hands, i.e., competition among prospective second-period employers implies that the contract the workers accept for the second period must generate principal's zero expected pro…ts.
Therefore, normalizing the price of output to unity, principal's zero pro…t condition is:
Then, the optimal …xed part of the second-period wage can be obtained using the following condition:
E f =z 1 g and V f =z 1 g have the same expression as in the benchmark case without career-risk concerns. Now, replacing c 2 (z 1 ; b 2 ) and a 2 (b 2 ) in the agent's maximization problem, we obtain b 2 :
In the same way, using the last maximization problem, we obtain l :
Since z 1 is a signal about the agent's ability, when z 1 is high, the principal reduces his training on-the-job spendings due to his belief the trader is a high type. It is worth remarking since Using the last expression, we obtain l S < l L which implies if we only take into account this training on-the-job e¤ect, the non-contingent long-term contract variable compensation are greater than the contingent short-term ones in the second period, i.e., for old managers. In this way, this e¤ect reinforce the proposition 2.2. Hereafter, we assume l S = 0, because there are no incentives to the principal to invest in training on-the-job due to the term of the contract.
Given the optimal second-period contract derive above, the trader's …rst period incentive problem is to choose a 1 to maximize:
So far we have takenâ 1 , as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes the worker's best response to the market's second-period conjecture about …rst-period e¤ort,â 1 . Since equation (29) does not depend onâ 1 , in equilibrium, the market's conjecture coincides with the optimal …rst period e¤ort. Therefore, the equilibrium conjecture is:â 1 = a 1 (b 1 ).
Substituting a 1 (b 1 ) and c 1 (b 1 ) in the …rst-period agent's maximization problem yields the …rst-period worker's expected utility for an arbitrary b 1 :
The main implication of this extension is even young managers could prefer non-contingent long-term labor contract because the increasing of the training on-the-job costs goes up their utility -through the increasing in their variable compensation-, there still exist some cases when the large di¤erence between short-maturity projects variance and the long-maturity one implies young managers short-term labor contract surplus is greater than the long-term one.
We summarize the last result in the following proposition:
4 Implications to the Financial Market E¢ ciency
Only Newswatchers Traders
In this section, using Hong and Stein's model, we begin by describing how is the price formation when only newswatchers are present. The model considers that at every time t, the newswatchers trade claims on a risky asset. This asset pays a single liquidating dividend at time T. This value can be written as:
where all the 0 s are zero mean gaussian white noise random variable with variance 2 . Now, we consider that news move gradually through the newswatchers which mainly explain the observed underreaction in asset returns 10 .
Assumption 4.1 We assume that information moves gradually across the newswatcher population. But, in t + z 1 the dividend innovation will be common knowledge for all the groups.
In order to incorporate this assumption, we divide the population into z equalsized groups and that every dividend innovation can be decomposed into z independent sub-innovations, j = 1 j + ::: + z j , each with the same variance 2 =z.
In this sense, the timing of information release is as follows. At time t, t+z 1 begins to spread, particularly, the …rst newswatcher group observes 1 t+z 1 , the second group observes 2 t+z 1 and so forth, through the last group, z group, which observe z t+z 1 . Then, at time t+1, in order to di¤use the information, the …rst group now observes 2 t+z 1 , the second group observes 3 t+z 1 , and so forth, through the last group, which observes 1 t+z 1 . This rotation process continues until t + z 1, at which point everybody has directly observed each of the subinnovations, i.e., t+z 1 has become completely public by time t + z 1:
In other words, in t + z 1 the dividend innovation will be common knowledge for all the groups. In order to understanding this concept, we …rst need to de…ne the knowledge operator.
De…nition 4.1 The Knowledge Operator is
This is an alternative concept for representing agent i's information. Knowledge operator reports all the states of the world, that is an event, in which agent i considers a certain event E posible 11 . second, now, we will introduce the group knowledge operator.
De…nition 4.2 The Group Knowledge Operator is
In general terms, the intersection of all events reported by the individual knowledge operators gives us the states of the world in which all members of the group G know an event E. Thirdly, we will de…ne the nth order mutual knowledge.
De…nition 4.3 The nth order mutual knowledge is
For n = 2, we have:
11 Consider the following example. There are …ve states ! 1 = fd high ; p high g, ! 2 = fd high ; p low g, ! 3 = fd low ; p high g, ! 4 = fd low ; p low g, ! 5 = fd = 0; p = 0g. The event E could be "dividend is high", then, E = f! 1 ; ! 2 g. Suppose that individual i knows event E only in state ! 1 , this means that
This means, if an event E is nth order mutual knowledge, then everybody knows E and everybody knows that everybody knows E and so on. Finally, an event is common knowledge if everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows and so on ad in…nitum that event E is true 12 .
De…nition 4.4 E is common knowledge if
It is worthy to note that this rotation process implies that even as information moves slowly across population, everybody is on average equally well-informed. Then, the parameter z is a proxy for the rate of information ‡ow because higher values of it implies slower information di¤usion.
In order to solve this model, we need to establish two additional asumptions.
Assumption 4.2 At every time t, newswatchers formulate their asset demands based on the static-optimization notion.
This static-optimization notion consists in the assumption that they buy and hold the risky asset until the liquidating dividend at time T.
Assumption 4.3 While newswatchers can condition on the information sets described above, they do not condition on current or past prices.
Finally, we assume that all newswatchers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function with the same risk-aversion parameter, and all of them live until the ending date T. For simplicity, we assume that the riskless interest rate is normalized to zero, and the supply of the asset is …xed at Q.
Lemma 4.1 Under the assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and the main characteristics of the assets and newswatchers. Given that the conditional variance of fundamentals is the same for all newswatchers, the price at time t is:
Proof: The result is obtained using the equilibrium concept of Walrasian equilibrium with private valuations.
This proposition asserts that the new information works its way linearly into the price over z periods. For simplicity, given that is a function of the newswatchers' risk aversion and the variance of shocks -both exogenous parameters-, hereafter, is equal one.
Momentum Traders and Newswatchers
The main characteristic of the momentum traders is they live for …nite horizons which is opposite to the newswatchers behavior. However, we assume that momentum traders have a CARA utility function as well.
The microestructure of our model is the following one. The momentum traders transact with the newswatchers by means of market orders. They submit quantity orders, without the knowledge of the price at which these orders will be executed. Given that newswatchers double as market-makers in this framework, the price thus is determined by the competition among these traders.
In our model, at every time t, a new generation of momentum traders enters the market taking a position, and holds it for j periods, i.e., until t+j. For simplicity, we consider j as exogenous parameter.
Assumption 4.4 Momentum traders make forecasts based on past price changes where the only conditioning variable is the cumulative price change over the last period, that is, P t 1 P t 2 . In this sense, we restrict momentum traders to making univariate forecasts.
This is the way we introduce a bounded rationality in this kind of agents because momentum traders do not have the computational horsepower to run complicated multivariate regressions. Now, we incorporate the notion of career concerns in the momentum traders in order to explain how the existence of this career concerns produces more overreaction in asset returns. Unlike Hong's model, we consider the heterogeneity in the optimal incentives contracts between young and old momentum traders which a¤ect their investment horizons and the prices dynamic. It is worthy to note that this relationship between incentives contracts and overreaction in asset returns has not been regarding in the recent literature. Then, we consider the following assumption in order to incorporate this innovation.
Assumption 4.5 We assume every momentum trader born in t live for j, if j k, and for k periods, if k > j. We thus de…ne as young momentum trader who borns in t and lives for (j s) periods and as old momentum trader who lives for k (j s) periods, where s is the number of old traders at time t.
Then, including career concerns concept, young momentum traders take a position, and hold it for j s periods, however, old momentum traders take a position, and hold it for k (j s) periods, where k > j. As we made mention before, given the history of old traders'performance have been revealed, then, the mutual fund owners'prediction about their ability is better than when they are young. This result implies that owners have more reliability in old traders than the young ones. Therefore, an optimal contract design by the mutual fund owner could authorize old traders to hold positions by more time compared with young momentum traders as we prove in the last section. We assume again k and j are exogenous parameters.
Under the assumption 4.4 which includes the career concerns concept and the aforementioned main charateristics of momentum traders, we can obtain the different order ‡ows for both young and old momentum traders.
Lemma 4.2 Under the assumption 4.4 and 4.5, the order ‡ow from generation-t young momentum traders, F y t , is of the form:
so long as the order ‡ow from generation-t old momentum traders, F o t , is of the form:
with 1 > 2
Proof: Notice that this result is directly obtained using the mean-variance preferences of these investors 13 . On the other hand, the di¤erence between young and old momentum traders -1 > 2 -is due to their di¤erent investments strategies. They hold their positions for di¤erent horizons of time -k > j -.
Both elasticities have to be determined from optimization on the part of young and old momentum traders.
It is worth to emphasize that newswatchers only take into account the news of fundamentals, this implies newswatchers treat the momentum traders'order ‡ow as an uninformative supply shock. If we assume that this not happens, we then will be inconsistent with assumption 2.3, newswatchers do not condition on prices. This means we do not allow these traders learn from prices.
Lemma 4.3 Under the assumptions 4. 1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 , and the main characteristics of the assets and newswatchers. Given that the conditional variance of fundamentals is the same for all newswatchers and there are j generations of momentum traders (young and old traders) in the market, the price at time t is:
where s is the number of old traders at time t.
Proof: The result is obtained using the equilibrium concept of Walrasian equilibrium with private valuations as Lemma 4.1, however, in this case, the aggregate supply S t absorved for the newswatchers is now given by
From now on, given that the constants Q and A play no role, we disregard them.
If we assume that 1 and 2 are known, we can proof that prices are covariance stationary (See Appendix 2).
The nature of Equilibrium
Now, we will …nd the elasticities determined from optimization of the part of the young and the old momentum traders. Disregarding constants, i.e., F y t = 1 P t 1 and F o t = 2 P t , the optimal condition for young momentum trader is: 1 = 'cov(P t+j P t ; P t 1 ) V ar( P t 1 )V ar(P t+j P t = P t 1 )
so long as for old momentum trader is:
'cov(P t+k P t ; P t 1 ) V ar( P t 1 )V ar(P t+k P t = P t 1 )
Where ' is the risk tolerance.
In this way, the de…nition of equilibrium is a …xed point such that 1 and 2 are given by the two last equations, while at the same time price process satisfy lemma 2.3.
Given that the asset returns are covariance stationary, this implies we will consider risk tolerance parameter less than one, since this in turn ensures that j 1 j and j 2 j are su¢ ciently small which guarantees the stationarity of these processes. Now, we can make several observations about nature of equilibrium. First, we have:
Lemma 4.4 In any covariance stationary equilibrium, 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. That is, young and old momentum traders, must behave as trend-chasers.
Proof: Suppose 1 = 0 and 2 = 0, then, prices are determined by equation (33), when only the newswatchers are in the market. However, in this case, cov(P t+j ; P t 1 ) > 0 and cov(P t+k ; P t 1 ) > 0, then, by equations (37) and (38),
Proof: From time t to time t+z 1, all the newswatchers estimate D T , however, in the time t + z 1, they have completely incorporated the news shocks into their forecasts. Therefore, in the absence of momentum traders'order ‡ows, the price is just right at this time. But, by lemma 4.4, any positive news shock must generate an initially positive impulse to momentum traders'order ‡ow. Furthermore, the cumulative order ‡ow must be increasing until at least time t + k, given k > j, since none of the old momentum traders hold their positions until t + k + 1 14 .
Due to the di¢ culty to solve the model in closed form, we resort to computational algorithm to …nd the …xed point. In the next section, we show the prices impulse responses in front of news regarding variations in momentum traders' horizons and we perform numerical comparative statics when the risk tolerance parameter changes and when the difussion of information is more quickly.
Numerical Comparative Statics
In this section, we perform a variety of numerical comparative statics exercises. Given the information di¤usion, z = 12, the risk tolerance parameter, ' = 1=3, the standard deviation of shocks equal to 0.5 per month and s which varies according to changes in k and j, we compute the equilibrium value of and the cumulative impulse response of prices to one-unit shock.
First, we examine how our model change in front of di¤erent values of momentum traders'horizon, j and k, under the condition that k > j. We then experiment with values of k ranging from 3 to 9 months, given j = 3.
When we introduce the distortion in incentives contracts for the old momentum traders, we obtain more overreaction in prices than the model with only newswatchers -benchmark case -. However, as k increases, we observe that this e¤ect decreases, in the sense that the prices return more quickly to the benchmark case (See Figure 1) . Then, if we had incentives contract such that both young and old momentum traders can hold their positions for long horizons, this would imply that we observe less overreaction in prices. In sum, the main result is the larger the di¤erences in holding of assets by young and old momentum traders, the higher the overreaction of asset returns.
second, in …gure 2, we analyze the e¤ect of changing momentum traders' risk tolerance. We set j = 6 and k = 9, and allow ' to vary. By equations (37) and (38), we expect as risk tolerance increases, young and old momentum traders respond more aggressively to past prices changes, then, 1 and 2 increases. This e¤ect causes the impulse respond function to reach higher peaks values. Finally, in …gure 3, we set again j = 6 and k = 9, and allow z to vary. As z increases, increases, this means that there exists a monotonic relationship between this two variables because the slower the newswatchers are to …gure things out, the greater the pro…t opportunities for young and old momentum traders. 
Summary and Extensions
This paper addresses an important puzzle in …nancial economics: why fund's managers invest in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain more pro…ts by holding positions in securities with longer maturity. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon based on the labor contracts signed between institutional investors and their traders.
In particular, we examine how di¤erences in the pay-for-performance's sensitivity of young and old traders a¤ect their investment horizon decisions when career concerns are considered. In our framework, young traders only care about their career concerns. By analyzing the tension between explicit and implicit incentives contained in the optimal labor contracts, we then characterize the conditions under which young (old) traders prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) assets. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the history of old traders'performance have already been revealed, the principal's prediction about their ability is better than that made on the young ones. As a consequence, the fund's owners will have more reliability on old traders, and thereby, they will authorize them to hold bolder positions by comparison with young ones. Interestingly, this prediction is consistent with the recent evidence found by empirical literature focused on the U.S. stock market (see Chevalier and Ellison (1999) ).
Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results whether we include both career-risk concerns -how the agent's current performance a¤ects the variance of his future compensation -and training onthe-job costs. On the one hand, our …ndings suggest that the main results hold when the trader's career concerns prevail, i.e., when the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives is still observed. On the other hand, the training on-the-job costs increase the probability that young traders select non-contingent long-term labor contracts, raising thus their incentives to hold long-term positions. However, as long as the di¤erence between the variance of long-maturity and shortmaturity investments is su¢ ciently large, the young trader's surplus stemming from short-term labor contracts becomes eventually larger than the long-term ones, reversing therefore the horizon decisions.
The major implication of our central result is that the bias induced by the labor contracts on young momentum traders to prefer short-term securities may cause episodes of overreaction in stock prices observed in the real world. Therefore, we provide an alternative explanation for this market phenomenon based on the incentive composition embodied in the optimal labor contracts designed by institutional investors. All of this suggests that we will likely observe more and higher overreactions in stock prices as an increasing importance of institutional investors in the whole …nancial system is expected.
Some extensions of this work may take into account other aspects of the optimal contracts: switching costs when traders decide to change the job; other kind of remunerations in order to know more about the trader's ability, for instante, stock options; and so on. Furthermore, it should be considered other classes of performance process which also imply di¤erences in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and old managers. For instance, the variation of investments could follow a stationary autoregressive or a long memory process instead of a normal one which are more closed to the empirical works which have found that investment follows a long memory process 15 .
6 Notice that old traders do not have career concern, this implies, only exist explicit incentives in their surplus.
Statistical Functions of an Indicator Function
Density of an Indicator Function of X is:
Then, Then, E ( exp( xI x x )) is an increasing function of 2 2 , therefore, in the same way, we maximize the CARA utility function, we maximize the utility function with an indicator function.
7 Appendix 2 7.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
For simplicity, we assume k = j and disregard constants. Then, we denote:
where F t = P t 1 .
Using mean-variance preferences of this investors, this means:
M ax E(h) (1=2)rV ar(h)
We obtain the following …rst Order Condition:
where ' = 1= is the risk tolerance.
Rewriting this condition, we obtain: = 'Cov(P t+j P t ; P t 1 ) V ar( P t )V ar(P t+j P t ) (A4)
Prices are covariance stationary
First, we specify the ARMA representation of the returns process. Removing constants for simplicity and using equation (24), the process of P t is:
We assume j = k instead of k > j in order to simplify the proof. Assuming that satis…es proper conditions to be speci…ed, P t is a covariance stationary process. Let
When h = 0, we have the unconditional variance. The autocovariances of this process satisfy the following known Yule-Walkers equations:
and for h > 0, we have
For k > z 1, the …rst part of the right hand side is zero. But, when k z 1, solving the Yule-Walker equations, we can see if 1 and 2 satis…es proper conditions to be speci…ed, then, these autocovariances do not depend on time. This means, the return process is covariance stationary.
Since, we know that the optimal strategies of young and old momentum traders are given by the following equilibrium conditions: 1 = 'Cov( P t 1 ; P t+j P t ) V ar( P t )V ar(P t+j P t )
and 2 = 'Cov( P t 1 ; P t+k P t ) V ar( P t )V ar(P t+k P t )
furthermore, we know that P t+j P t = P t+j + :::
Notice that we consider in this part, k = j which implies in this case that 1 is equal to 2 .
Then, using the previous steps, it follows that:
Cov( P t 1 ; P t+j P t ) = j+1 + ::: + 2 (A12) and V ar(P t+j P t ) = j 0 + 2(j 1) 1 + ::: + 2(j (j 1)) j 1
But, if k > j, then, we have the following relationship:
Cov( P t 1 ; P t+j P t ) > Cov( P t 1 ; P t+k P t )
and V ar(P t+k P t ) > V ar(P t+j P t )
which implies 1 > 2 .
Using these formulas, the problem is reduced to …nding a …xed point in 1 and 2 that satis…es A9 and A10.
Finally, the return process is covariance stationary when 1 and 2 are less than one, because the asset return follows an ARMA(j + 1,z). For instance, suppose k = j = 1 (in this case, 1 = 2 ) and h = 1, then, the condition is just that the roots of
lie outside the unit circle 16 . Thus, the conditions are: 2 < 1 and 1 < < 1.
In the case when j = h, then, the roots x of 1 x + x h+1 = 0 (A17) must lie outside the unit circle, obtaining
Therefore, in order to equation (A18) holds, as h increases, j j should be decreases. 16 See Hamilton (1994) 
